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The Supreme Court Allows 
Smaller Juries 
Randolph N. Jonakait 
Having declared trial by jury a fundamental right in Dun- 
can v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court began to take a closer 
look at some of the particular judicial rules that differed 
from state to state, such as jury size. In Williams v. Florida, 
the. Court found that the traditional twelve-person jury was 
not in fact a legal necessity; a six-person jury, but no smaller, 
would pass constitutional muster. As Randolph N. Jonakait, 
a professor of law at New York Law School, explains, this 
finding overturned a previous ruling, in Thompson v. Utah, 
holding that citizens were entitled to a common law jury of 
twelve members, at least in federal court. Drawing on a 
number of studies, as well as his own experience as a lawyer 
for the New York City Legal Aid Society, Jonakait disputes 
the Court's finding that size is not especially significant to 
jury fairness. For Jonakait, twelve-person juries are fairer, 
more likely to contain minority members, and less inconsis- 
tent than smaller juries. 
I n 1968 Duncan v. Louisiana held that the right to a jury trial in a criminal case is fundamental and that the same 
right applies in both state and federal prosecutions. The fed- 
eral courts had but a single model for a jury trial. A jury con- 
sisted of twelve people who had to reach unanimity in order 
to render a verdict, as the Supreme Court had said two year 
earlier. The right applied to trials of any federal crime that 
was not "petty," which was defined as a crime carrying a pos- 
sible penalty of more than six months. 
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The states, in contrast, had diverse models for juries. Some 
states employed juries smaller than twelve; some did not re- 
quire juries to be unanimous in their decisions; and although 
all states guaranteed jury trials, they varied concerning the 
kinds of crimes to which this right applied. Indeed, Louisiana 
law at the time of Duncan illustrated all these complexities. 
Jury trials were guaranteed, but only for crimes that carried 
sentences of death or hard labor. If not, the trial went to a 
judge without a jury. If the crime permitted, but did not re- 
quire, a sentence of hard labor, the accused was entitled to a 
five-person jury with a unanimous verdict. If the crime re- 
quired a punishment of hard labor, a twelve-person jury was 
required, but only nine of the jurors had to agree to reach a 
verdict. If the crime was punishable by death, the jury was 
twelve and the verdict had to be unanimous. 
After Duncan, the Supreme Court began to consider whether 
the different state forms of jury trials were constitutional. The 
process began in 1970 when the Court in Williams v. Florida 
held that a jury of six passed constitutional muster. In doing 
so the Court abandoned its precedent of Thompson v. Utah, 
' set at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Thompson v. Utah 
A Mr. Thompson was charged in the Utah territory with calf- 
rustling. He was tried and convicted in the territorial courts 
by a jury of twelve, as federal law dictated, but his motion 
for a new trial was granted. This second trial was held in the 
state court because by then Utah had gained statehood. As 
the Utah constitution permitted, this jury had only eight peo- 
ple. In 1898 the case made its way to the Supreme Court, 
which first noted that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial applied in the territorial courts and that, whatever the 
normal powers of the state, any trial for a crime committed 
before statehood had to provide a jury consistent with the 
federal constitution. The Court stated that the federal jury 
trial right required a jury constituted as it was in the com- 
mon law of this country and England. This, Thompson con- 
cluded, was a jury of twelve acting unanimously. "The wise 
men who framed the constitution of the United States and 
68 The Right to a Trial by Jury 
the people who approved it were of the opinion that life and 
liberty, when involved in criminal prosecutions, would not be 
adequately secured except through the unanimous verdict of 
twelve jurors. It was not for the state, in respect of a crime 
committed within its limits while it was a territory, to dis- 
pense with that guaranty simply because its people had 
reached the conclusion that the truth could be as well ascer- 
tained, and the liberty of an accused be as well guarded, by 
eight as well as by twelve jurors in a criminal case." 
Williams v. Florida 
Seventy years later the Supreme Court again considered the 
issue of jury size. This Court found that Thompson's basic 
approach was wrong. Williams u. Florida agreed that the 
common law required juries of twelve, but the Court went on 
to state that "there is absolutely no indication in 'the intent 
of the Framers' of an explicit decision to equate the constitu- 
tional and common-law characteristics of the jury." Instead, 
the Court concluded that no one could now know precisely 
what the framers meant by a jury trial. 
Rather than searching history for the constitutionally re- 
quired number of jurors, Williams concluded that a jury's 
characteristics should be defined by the function that the 
framers envisioned for juries: the prevention of governmen- 
tal oppression. Williams continued, "Given this purpose, the 
essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition 
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense 
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community partic- 
ipation and shared responsibility that results from the 
group's determination of guilt or innocence." Differently sized 
bodies could serve these functions, but "the number should 
probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free 
from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair 
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the 
community." 
The Court, citing but a few experiments and mostly using 
its own instincts, concluded that juries of six would little af- 
fect how well juries performed. The Court intuited that the 
change in community representation between juries of six and 
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twelve "seems likely to be negligible," and while juries of six 
might be less likely to hang than juries of twelve, this "seems 
unlikely to inure perceptibly to the advantage of either side. 
... And, certainly the reliability of the jury as a factfinder 
hardly seems likely to be a function of its size." The Court con- 
cluded that the twelve-person jury was merely "a historical 
accident." A jury of six, the Court held, is constitutional. 
Studies of Jury Size 
Williams engendered a storm of controversy by concluding that 
halving the historical jury would not affect group deliberations 
and community participation. Scholars quickly produced a 
flurry of studies about how size affects jury performance. 
Three years after Williams, however, that research did little 
to alter the Supreme Court's view of smaller juries. In 1973 
Colgrove u. Battin held that six-person civil juries did not vi- 
olate the Seventh Amendment's right to juries in civil cases. 
Consigning its discussion of the studies to a footnote, the 
Court noted that since 1970, "much has been written about 
the six-member jury, but nothing that persuades us to depart 
from the conclusion reached in Williams." 
In 1978, however, while reviewing Claude Ballew's misde- 
meanor obscenity conviction by an Atlanta jury of five, the 
Court took more note of the scholarship regarding jury num- 
bers. The Court now stressed that social science studies 
showed smaller juries had a negative effect on deliberations. 
"The smaller the group, the less likely are members to make 
crit.ical contributions necessary for the solution of a given 
problem .... Memory is important for accurate jury determi- 
nations. As juries decrease in size, ... they are less likely to 
have members who remember each of the important pieces 
of evidence or argument. Furthermore, the smaller the 
group, the less likely it is to overcome the biases of its mem- 
bers to obtain an accurate result. When individual and group 
decision-making were compared, it was seen that groups per- 
formed better because prejudices of individuals were fre- 
quently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted." 
These studies also showed that accuracy decreased and 
inconsistency increased with smaller panels. Moreover, because 
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juries generally hang because one or two jurors hold out 
against the remainder favoring conviction, the decrease in 
hung juries resulting from a smaller jury size disproportion- 
ately harms criminal defendants by increasing the convic- 
tion rate. Finally, the Court noted, smaller juries will not 
represent the community as well as larger ones. "If a minor- 
ity viewpoint is shared by 10% of the community, 28.2% of 
12-member juries may be expected to have no minority rep- 
resentation, but 53.1 % of 6-member juries would have none." 
Although these data suggested that the assumptions un- 
derlying the acceptance of six-person juries were wrong, the 
Court did not overturn its earlier decision. Instead, without 
"pretend[ing] to discern a clear line between six members 
and five," the Court reaffirmed that six-person juries were 
constitutional but held that juries of less than six were not. 
Research on how size affects jury performance has contin- 
ued. The studies consistently show that larger juries are more 
likely to contain minority members, recall more of the evi- 
dence, spend more time deliberating, and bring more infor- 
mational resources to those deliberations than are six-person 
juries. Just as individuals render more variable decisions 
than groups, juries of six produce more variability than do ju- 
ries of twelve. In civil cases, studies generally agree, smaller 
juries show an increased variability in damages, with a higher 
average award .... 
1ill 
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The Supreme Court's Faulty Intuition 
Juries can be, and in some places are, smaller than six. In 
concluding that halving the traditional jury would not signif- 
icantly affect how juries perform, the Supreme Court cited 
only a few empirical studies without probing their validity. 
Instead, it relied almost entirely on its own instincts. Com- 
petent studies, however, show these judicial assumptions to 
be wrong. In other words, the justices did not know what they 
were talking about. 
This may be surprising, but it should not be. Few Supreme 
Court judges have had much contact with juries. The bar, like 
almost any human institution, has its own hierarchy. As a 
general rule, the less a lawyer deals with "common people," 
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the more prestigious the position she holds. The lawyer in- 
volved with mergers and acquisitions stands on a higher rung 
than one dealing with personal injuries or crimes. Supreme 
Court justices do not represent a cross-section of the bar. They 
generally come from the bar's elite, and this gentry seldom 
has much experience with juries. Because the Supreme 
Court's intuitions about juries do not come from any depth of 
experience, they should not automatically be trusted. 
There is, of course, a broader point here. Supreme Court 
Justices .are educated and thoughtful. If this group's intu- 
itions about juries should be viewed skeptically, surely suspi- 
cion is also in order for the views of many others about the 
jury system, no matter how smart, prestigious, or knowledge- 
able, when those opinions are based only on intuitions, as- 
sertions, and anecdotes and not on extensive experience or 
serious study. 
